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Abstract
This paper studies Tobin's proposition that ination \greases" the wheels of the
labor market. The analysis is carried out using a simple dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model with asymmetric wage adjustment costs. Optimal ination is de-
termined by a benevolent government that maximizes the households' welfare. The
Simulated Method of Moments is used to estimate the nonlinear model based on its
second-order approximation. Econometric results indicate that nominal wages are
downwardly rigid and that the optimal level of grease ination for the U.S. economy
is about 1.2 percent per year, with a 95% condence interval ranging from 0.2 to 1.6
percent.
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1 Introduction
In his presidential address to the American Economic Association in 1971, James Tobin
suggests that a positive rate of ination may be socially benecial in an economy where
nominal prices|in particular, nominal wages|are more downwardly rigid than upwardly
rigid (Tobin, 1972). To illustrate Tobin's argument, suppose that the economy is hit by an
exogenous shock that requires a decline in the real wage, such as a negative productivity
shock. Two plausible adjustment paths are to keep the price level xed and cut nominal
wages, and to keep the nominal wages xed and increase the price level. Tobin claims that
the former path, which is characterized by a zero ination rate, may involve signicant social
costs when nominal wages are downwardly rigid. Instead, the latter path, which features
a positive ination rate, may deliver the same reduction in the real wage at a lower cost.
The idea that ination eases the adjustment of the labor market by speeding the decline of
real wages following an adverse shock is described in the literature by the catchphrase that
ination \greases the wheels of the labor market."
This paper uses a stylized dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with asymmetric
nominal rigidities to formally examine Tobin's proposition and to construct a theory-based
estimate of the optimal amount of \grease" ination for the U.S. economy. Optimal ination
is determined in our model by a benevolent government that maximizes the households'
welfare under commitment (i.e., the Ramsey policy). A nonlinear approximation of the
model is estimated by the Simulated Method of Moments and an estimate of optimal grease
ination is constructed by measuring how much more expected ination asymmetric costs
yield compared to symmetric costs.
This subject matter is important because there is currently a discrepancy between eco-
nomic theory|that prescribes a zero-to-negative optimal ination rate|and monetary pol-
icy in practice|that explicitly or implicitly targets low, but strictly positive, ination rates.
The theoretical result that optimal ination is negative is driven by Friedman's rule (Fried-
man, 1969). Under Friedman's rule a rate of deation equal to the real return on capital
eliminates the wedge between social marginal cost of producing money, which is essentially
zero, and the private marginal cost of carrying money, which is the nominal interest rate.
Additional considerations like scal policy and price rigidity, deliver optimal ination rates
that are larger than Friedman's rule but still negative.1
1See, among many others, Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Chari and Kehoe (1999), Teles (2003), Khan,
King and Wolman (2003), Kim and Henderson (2005), and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004, 2006), as well as
references therein. In addition to the asymmetric nominal rigidities studied here, another reason because of
which optimal ination may be positive is the zero lower-bound on nominal interest rates (see, for example,
Billi, 2005).
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The idea that wages are more downwardly (than upwardly) rigid dates at least to Keynes
(1936, Chapter 21). Empirical evidence on downward wage rigidity using micro-level data
takes the form of attitude surveys and the empirical analysis of wage distributions. Bewley
(1995) and Campbell and Kamlani (1997) nd that employers cut wages only in cases of ex-
treme nancial distress while worrying about the eect of nominal wage cuts on the worker's
morale. Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986) nd that individuals dislike nominal wage
cuts more than an alternative scenario even when both of them involve the same real wage
cut. Researchers who study the distribution of nominal wage changes at the individual level
point out that it features a peak at zero and is positively skewed with very few nominal wage
cuts. See, for example, McLaughlin (1994), Akerlof et al. (1996), and Card and Hyslop
(1997) for the United States; Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003) for Japan; Castellanos et al.
(2004) for Mexico; and Fehr and Goette (2005) for Switzerland. Institutional characteristics,
like laws forbidding nominal wage cuts (Mexico) or making the current nominal wage the
default outcome when union-employer negotiations fail, may also contribute to downward
nominal wage rigidity.
This paper reports four main results. First, U.S. prices and wages are rigid, but in the
case of wages, rigidity is asymmetric in the sense that they are more downwardly rigid. This
conclusion is based on an econometric estimate of the asymmetry in the wage adjustment
cost function. Second, the Ramsey policy prescribes a positive (gross) rate of price ination
of about 1.012 (i.e., optimal grease ination of about 1.2 percent per year). This result
is driven by prudence, meaning that the benevolent planner prefers the systematic, but
small, price and wage adjustment costs associated with a positive ination rate rather than
taking the chance of incurring the large adjustment costs associated with nominal wage
decreases. Third, asymmetry in wage adjustment costs delivers non-trivial implications for
optimal responses following a productivity shocks and generates higher-order properties that
are roughly in line with those found in the U.S. data. Finally, in the case where monetary
policy were implemented by a strict ination target, the optimal target is substantially larger
than the unconditional ination mean obtained under the Ramsey policy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 constructs a model with imperfect compe-
tition and asymmetric price- and wage-adjustment costs and describes the Ramsey problem
of the benevolent government. Section 3 presents the econometric methodology and reports
estimates of the structural parameters. Section 4 reports estimates of optimal grease ina-
tion, studies the dynamic implications of the model, and compares welfare under the Ramsey
policy and under strict ination targeting. Section 5 concludes and discusses current and
future work in our research agenda on asymmetric nominal rigidities.
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2 The Model
2.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of innitely-lived households indexed by n 2 [0; 1] :
Households are identical, except for the fact that they have dierentiated job skills which
give them monopolistically competitive power over their labor supply. At time  , household
n maximizes
E
1X
t=
(t )
 
(cnt )
1 
1    
(hnt )
1+
1 + 
!
; (1)
where  2 (0; 1) is the subjective discount factor, cnt is consumption, hnt is hours worked, and
 and  are positive preference parameters.2 Consumption is an aggregate of dierentiated
goods indexed by i 2 [0; 1]
cnt =
0@ 1Z
0
(cni;t)
1=di
1A ; (2)
where  > 1: In this specication, the elasticity of substitution between goods is constant
and equal to =(  1). When  ! 1, goods become perfect substitutes and the elasticity
of substitution tends to innity. When !1; the aggregator becomes the Cobb-Douglas
function and the elasticity is unity.
As monopolistic competitors, households choose their wage and labor supply taking as
given the rms' demand for their labor type. Labor market frictions induce a cost in the
adjustment of nominal wages. This cost takes the form of the linex function (as introduced
by Varian, 1974)
nt = (W
n
t =W
n
t 1) = 
0@exp

  

W nt =W
n
t 1   1

+  

W nt =W
n
t 1   1

  1
 2
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where W nt is the nominal wage, and  and  are cost parameters. This functional form
is attractive for four reasons. First, the cost depends on both the magnitude and sign of
the wage adjustment. Consider, for example, the case where  > 0: As W nt increases over
W nt 1, the linear term dominates and the cost associated with wage increases rises linearly. In
contrast, asW nt decreases belowW
n
t 1; it is the exponential term that dominates and the cost
2In preliminary work, we studied a more general formulation with aggregate shocks to the disutility of
work and to the overall level of utility. However, results were very similar to the ones reported here. The
shock to the disutility of work behaves like the productivity shock specied in Section 2.2 but its estimated
conditional variance was much smaller. The shock to the level of utility disturbs the household's Euler
equation for consumption, but the Ramsey planner would adjust the nominal interest rate to perfectly undo
this shock's eects. Hence, decision rules for all variables (except for the nominal interest rate) would be
independent of the shock.
[3]
associated with wage decreases rises exponentially. Hence, nominal wage decreases involve
a larger frictional cost than increases, even if the two percentage magnitudes are the same.
The converse is true in the case where  < 0. Second, the function nests the quadratic form
as a special case when  tends to zero.3 Thus, the comparison between the model with
asymmetric costs and a restricted version with quadratic costs is straightforward. Third,
the linex function is dierentiable everywhere and strictly convex for any  > 0: Finally, this
function does not preclude nominal wage cuts that, although relatively rare, are observed
in micro-level data. In order to develop further the readers' intuition, Figure 1 plots the
quadratic and asymmetric cost functions, the latter in the case of a positive  .
There are two types of nancial assets: one-period nominal bonds and Arrow-Debreu
state-contingent securities. The household enters period t with Bt 1 nominal bonds and
a portfolio At 1 of state-contingent securities, and then receives wages, interests, dividends
and state-contingent payos. These resources are used to nance consumption and the
acquisition of nancial assets to be carried out to the next period. Expressed in real terms,
the household's budget constraint is
cnt +
t;t+1A
n
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Pt
=
 
W nt h
n
t
Pt
!
(1  nt ) +
Dnt
Pt
;
for t = ;  +1; : : : ;1, where t;t+1 is a vector of prices, It is the gross nominal interest rate,
Dnt are dividends and
Pt =
0@ 1Z
0
(Pi;t)
1=(1 )di
1A1=(1 ) ; (4)
is an aggregate price index with Pi;t denoting the price of good i. Without loss of generality,
it is assumed that the wage adjustment cost is paid by the household. Prices are measured
in terms of a unit of account called \money," but the economy is cashless otherwise.
The household's utility maximization involves choosing fcnt ; Ant ; Bnt ; W nt ; hnt g1t= subject
to the initial asset holdings and the sequence of wages, labor demand, budget constraints,
and a no-Ponzi-game condition. First-order necessary conditions include
(ct)
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whereby the marginal utilities wealth and consumption are equalized at the optimum, and
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3To see this, take the limit of () as  ! 0 by applying l'Ho^pital's rule twice.
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where =(   1) is the elasticity of substitution between labor types (as specied below in
the rms' problem), and (nt )
0 denotes the derivative of the cost function with respect to
its argument.4 Condition (6), usually referred to as the wage Phillips curve, equates the
marginal costs and benets of increasing W nt : The costs are the decrease in hours worked as
rms substitute away from the more expensive labor input, and the wage adjustment cost.
The benets are the increase in labor income per hour worked, the increase in leisure time as
rms reduce their demand for type-n labor, and the reduction in the future expected wage
adjustment cost. Given nominal consumption expenditures, the optimal consumption of
good i satises
cni;t =

Pi;t
Pt
 =( 1)
cnt : (7)
2.2 Firms
Each rm produces a dierentiated good i 2 [0; 1] using a production function featuring
decreasing returns to scale,
yi;t = xth
1 
i;t ; (8)
where yi;t is output of good i, hi;t is labor input,  2 (0; 1] is a production parameter, and xt
is an exogenous productivity shock. The productivity shock follows the stochastic process
ln(xt) =  ln(xt 1) + "t;
where  2 ( 1; 1) and "t is an identically and independently distributed innovation with
zero mean and variance 2. Labor input is an aggregate of heterogeneous labor supplied by
households,
hi;t =
0@ 1Z
0
(hni;t)
1=dn
1A ; (9)
where  > 1: The price of the labor input is
Wi;t =
0@ 1Z
0
(W nt )
1=(1 )dn
1A1  ; (10)
where W nt is the wage demanded by the supplier of type-n labor. Product dierentiation
gives the rm monopolistically competitive power, so price is a choice variable. However,
4The other rst-order conditions (not shown) price the nominal bond and the portfolio of state contingent
securities.
[5]
the adjustment of nominal prices is assumed to be costly. In particular, the real cost of a
price change per unit is
 it =  (Pi;t=Pi;t 1) = 
 
exp( & (Pi;t=Pi;t 1   1)) + & (Pi;t=Pi;t 1   1)  1
&2
!
; (11)
where  (> 0) and & are cost parameters. In what follows, we focus on the special case where
& ! 0 (i.e., the quadratic cost function proposed by Rotemberg, 1982) and price adjustment
costs are, therefore, symmetric.5
At time ; rm i maximizes the discounted sum of real prots
E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and ci;t =
1R
0
cni;tdn is total consumption demand for good i. Maximization is subject to the
technology (8), the downward-sloping consumption demand function (7), and the condition
that supply must meet the demand for good i at the posted price. First-order conditions
equate the marginal productivity of labor with its cost,
(1  )xth i;t = Wi;t=Pi;t; (12)
and the marginal costs with the marginal benets of increasing Pi;t;
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where 	t is the nominal marginal cost. On the left-hand side of this price Phillips curve, the
costs are the decrease in sales, which is proportional to the elasticity of substitution between
goods, and the price adjustment cost. On the right-hand side, the benets are the increase
in revenue for each unit sold, the decrease in the marginal cost, and the reduction in the
5In preliminary work, we considered an unrestricted version of the model with a possibly non-zero &.
However, a Wald test of & = 0 does not reject this hypothesis at the 5 percent signicance level, and
identication of the other parameters is considerably sharper when this restriction is imposed. Peltzman
(2000) studies the pricing decisions of a Chicago supermarket chain at the level of individual goods and
nds no asymmetry in its response to input price increases or decreases. Zbaracki et al. (2004) nds that
customers are antagonized by price changes, even when they involve a price decrease. Price decreases are
not always welcomed because passing lower prices downstream also involves adjustment costs and because
current price cuts make future price increases more costly (see p. 527). In summary, the data seem to be
in reasonable agreement with the assumption that price adjustment costs are symmetric.
[6]
future expected price adjustment cost. Given nominal expenditures on labor, the optimal
demand of type-n labor is
hnt =

W nt
Wt
 =( 1)
ht
where  =(  1) is the elasticity of demand for the labor of household n with respect to its
relative wage.
2.3 Symmetric Equilibrium
In the symmetric equilibrium, all households supply exactly the same amount of labor.
This implies that hnt = ht and, consequently, W
n
t = Wt: Since households are identical in all
other respects, it follows that their equilibrium choices will be same, that n subscripts can
be dropped without loss of generality, and that net holdings of Arrow-Debreu securities and
bonds can be neglected in the solution. Similarly, all rms are identical ex-post meaning
that they charge the same price and produce the same quantity. Hence, all relative prices
are one and the i subscripts can also be dropped. Substituting the government's budget
constraint and the prots of the (now) representative rm into the budget constraint of the
(now) representative household delivers the economy-wide resource constraint:
ct = yt(1   t)  wthtt: (14)
where wt = Wt=Pt is the real wage.
2.4 Monetary Policy
The government follows a Ramsey policy of maximizing the households' welfare subject to
the resource constraint while respecting the rst-order conditions of rms and households.6
That is, the government chooses fct; t; ht; wt; it; 
t; tg1t= to maximize
E
1X
t=
(t )
 
(ct)
1 
1    
(ht)
1+
1 + 
!
;
where 
t = Wt=Wt 1 is gross wage ination and t = Pt=Pt 1 is gross price ination, subject
to conditions (5), (6), (12), and (13), and taking as given previous values for wages, goods
prices, and shadow prices. Notice that in the formulation of the government's problem, it
is assumed that the discount factor used to evaluate future utilities is the same as that used
6Admittedly, the Ramsey policy is an incomplete characterization of U.S. monetary policy. However,
this policy|unlike ad-hoc policy rules|endogenously determines the behavior of the government, including
the deterministic steady state for ination. In Section 4.4, we compare the outcomes of the Ramsey policy
with those of a simple ination targeting rule
[7]
by households.7 It is also assumed that the government can commit to the implementation
of the optimal policy.
Since this problem does not have a closed-form solution, we use a perturbation method
that involves taking a second-order Taylor series expansion of the government's decision
rules as well as its constraints and characterizing local dynamics around the deterministic
steady state. See Jin and Judd (2002), Kim, Kim, Schaumburg and Sims (2003), and
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) for a detailed explanation of this approach.8
3 Estimation
3.1 Data
The data used to estimate the model are quarterly observations of the real wage, hours
worked, real consumption per capita, the price ination rate, the wage ination rate, and
the nominal interest rate between 1964Q2 to 2006Q2. The sample starts in 1964 because
aggregate data on wages and hours worked are not available prior to that year. The raw
data were taken from the database available at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The
rates of price and wage ination are measured by the percentage change in the Consumer
Price Index (CPI) and the average hourly earnings for private industries. Hours worked
is the total number of weekly hours worked in private industries. The nominal interest
rate is the three-month Treasury Bill rate. Real consumption is measured by the Personal
Consumption Expenditures in nondurable goods and services per capita divided by the CPI.
The population series corresponds to the quarterly average of the mid-month U.S. population
estimated by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Except for the nominal interest rate,
all data are seasonally adjusted at the source. All series were logged and linearly detrended
prior to the estimation of the model.
3.2 Econometric Methodology
The second-order approximate solution of our nonlinear DSGE model is estimated using
the Simulated Method of Moments (SMM). The application of SMM for the estimation
7In preliminary work, we relaxed this assumption and estimated the government's discount factor sepa-
rately from that of households. However, econometric estimates were remarkably similar and diered only
after the fth decimal. It is interesting to note that when both factors are assumed to be dierent, the iden-
tication of the wage asymmetry parameter is sharper because in this case this parameter aects rst-order
dynamics.
8The codes that we employed were adapted from those originally written by Stephanie Schmitt-Grohe
and Martin Uribe. The dynamic simulations of the nonlinear model are based on the pruned version of the
model, as suggested by Kim, Kim, Schaumburg and Sims (2003).
[8]
of time-series models was proposed by Lee and Ingram (1991) and Due and Singleton
(1993). Ruge-Murcia (2007) uses Monte-Carlo analysis to compare various methods used
for the estimation of DSGE models and reports that moment-based estimators are gener-
ally more robust to misspecication than Maximum Likelihood (ML). This is important
because economic models are stylized by denition and misspecication of an unknown form
is likely.9 Method of Moments estimators are also attractive for the estimation of nonlinear
DSGE models because the numerical evaluation of its objective function is relatively cheap.
This means, for example, that the researcher can aord to use genetic algorithms for its
optimization. These algorithms require a larger number of function evaluations than alter-
native gradient-based methods, but greatly reduce the possibility of converging to a local
optimum|rather than the global one.
Dene  to be a q1 vector of structural parameters, gt to be a p1 vector of empirical
observations on variables whose moments are of our interest, and g() to be the synthetic
counterpart of gt whose elements come from simulated data generated by the model. Then,
the SMM estimator, b; is the value that solves
min
fg
G()0WG(); (15)
where
G() = (1=T )
TX
t=1
gt   (1=T )
TX
=1
g();
T is the sample size,  is a positive constant, and W is a q  q weighting matrix. Under
the regularity conditions in Due and Singleton (1993),
p
T (b   )! N(0;(1 + 1=)(D0W 1D) 1D0W 1SW 1D(D0W 1D) 1); (16)
where
S = lim
T!1
V ar
 
(1=
p
T )
TX
t=1
gt
!
; (17)
and D = E(@g()=@) is a q  p matrix assumed to be nite and of full column rank.10
9On the other hand, under the assumption that the model is correctly specied, ML is statistically more
ecient than the Method of Moments. This means that, even though both methods deliver consistent
parameter estimates, those obtained by ML would typically have smaller standard errors.
10An alternative approach is to analytically compute the moments predicted by the model based on the
pruned quadratic solution and use them in the objective function instead of (1=T )
TP
=1
g(): We followed
this GMM approach in preliminary work but found it problematic because, under the assumption that the
private and social discount factors are the same, rst-order dynamics are independent of the asymmetry
parameter, and, consequently,  is not identied. Notice that for the pruned version of nonlinear DSGE
models, SMM is not statistically equivalent to GMM as  ! 1. In contrast, the two are asymptotically
equivalent in the case of linear models (see Ruge-Murcia, 2007)
[9]
In this application,  contains the discount factor (), the curvature parameters of the
utility function ( and ), the parameters of the adjustment cost function (;  and ),
and the parameters of the productivity shock process ( and ). For the simulation of
the model, the productivity innovations are drawn from a Normal distribution.11 The
weighting matrixW is the diagonal of the inverse of the matrix with the long-run variance
of the moments, S: In turn, S is computed using the Newey-West estimator with a Barlett
kernel. The derivatives in the Jacobian matrixD are numerically computed at the optimum.
The moments in G() are ve (out of six) variances, all twenty one covariances and all six
autocovariances of the data series.12
Three parameters are weakly identied in the initial estimation and, consequently, we
use additional information to x their values to economically plausible numbers during the
estimation routine. These parameters are the curvature of the production function (1  
) and the elasticities of substitution between goods and between labor types ( and ,
respectively). Data from the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) show
that the share of labor in total income is approximately 2/3 and, therefore, a plausible value
for  is 1/3. The elasticities of substitution between goods and between labor types are
xed to  = 1:1 and  = 1:4; respectively. This value for  is standard in the literature.
Sensitivity analysis with respect to  indicates that results are robust to using similarly
plausible values.
3.3 SMM Estimates
SMM parameter estimates based on the second-order approximate solution of the model
are reported in the rst column of Table 1. Regarding the preference parameters, notice
that the coecient that determines the consumption curvature () is statistically dierent
from zero but not from one at the 5 percent signicance level. Since, in addition, its point
estimate is quantitatively very close to one, it follows that consumption preferences may
11We also estimated a version of the model where innovations follow a t distribution. Results are very
similar to those reported here because the estimated number of degrees of freedom is large and the two
distributions (the t and the Normal) resemble each other.
12The variance of the real wage is not included in G() because the real wage is the ratio of nominal wages
to the CPI and so it is possible to show that
V ar( bwt) = (1=2)(V ar(bt) + V ar(b
t))  Cov(bt; b
t) + Cov( bwt; bwt 1);
where the "hat" denotes deviation from the deterministic steady state. Hence, the variance of the real wage
contributes no additional information beyond that contained in the variances of price ination and wage
ination, their covariance, and the autocovariance of the real wage, all of which are included in G(): In
other words, if one were to include the variance of the real wage, then as a result of the linear combination
above, the Jacobian matrix of the moments, D, would not be of full rank and regularity conditions in Due
and Singleton (1993) would not be satised.
[10]
be well approximated by a logarithmic function. On the other hand, the coecient that
determines the leisure curvature () is quantitatively and statistically close to zero. Thus,
the aggregate representation of the households' disutility of work is empirically consistent
with the indivisible-labor model (Hansen, 1985).
Regarding the parameters of the adjustment cost functions, the hypotheses that  = 0
and  = 0 can be rejected against the respective alternatives that  > 0 and  > 0 at
the 10 and 5 percent signicance levels. In other words, the data rejects the hypothesis
that U.S. nominal wages and prices are exible in favor of the alternative hypothesis that
they are rigid. Similar results are reported, among others, by Kim (2000), Ireland (2001),
and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) using linear DSGE models that explicitly or
implicitly impose symmetry in the adjustment costs of nominal variables.
The estimate of the wage asymmetry parameter is 901:4 with a standard error of 426:2.
Since this estimate of positive and statistically dierent from zero at the 5 percent level, we
conclude that U.S. nominal wages are more downwardly than upwardly rigid. Returning to
Figure 1, note that the parameters used to construct the asymmetric cost function are the
SMM estimates reported in Table 1, that is  = 33:72 and  = 901:4: This gure implies,
for example, that an aggregate nominal-wage cut of one percent would involve frictional
adjustment costs of 0.1 percent of annual labor income, while a cut of 2 percent would
involve costs of 1.4 percent. Finally, estimates of the parameters of the process of the
productivity shock are very similar to those reported in earlier empirical work.
In order to examine the properties of our model, it is useful to have as benchmark
a restricted version of the model with quadratic wage adjustment costs. This restricted
version corresponds to the special case where  ! 0. SMM estimates of this model are
reported in the second column of Table 1. Note that the estimates of the preference and
productivity parameters for this model are very similar to those reported for the asymmetric
model. Estimates of the adjustment cost functions are imprecise but would tend to suggest
that wages are substantially more rigid than prices. This implication of the quadratic cost
model is not necessarily at odds with the data, except that results reported above in this
paper would nesse this implication by noting that most of observed nominal wage rigidity
is in the downward direction.
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4 Properties of the Estimated Model
4.1 Optimal Grease Ination
This section constructs a measure of optimal grease ination for the U.S. economy by cal-
culating how much asymmetric costs increase expected ination compared with symmetric
(i.e., quadratic) costs. For this purpose, we compute via simulation the unconditional
ination mean implied by the two versions of our model, as reported in Table 1.
Consider rst the model with symmetric costs (the right column). The unconditional
mean of annual gross ination is 1.000012 with the 95 percent condence interval of [1.000008,
1.000018].13 Since this condence interval does not include the value of 1, the null hypothesis
that optimal gross ination is unity can be rejected at the 5 percent signicance level. This
result is due to the model's departure from certainty equivalence. However, given the
clearly small magnitude of optimal net ination, of about 0.12 basis points, this departure
is economically insignicant.
Consider now the model with asymmetric costs. The estimate of the unconditional
mean of annual gross ination is 1.012 with 95 percent condence interval equal to [1.002,
1.016]. As before, this condence interval does not include 1 and, consequently, the null
hypothesis that optimal gross ination is unity can be rejected at the 5 percent signicance
level. However, the departure from certainty equivalence in this case is not only statistically
but also economically signicant. Optimal ination is substantially larger than 1 because
the monetary authority acts prudently and reduces the probability of facing highly costly
downward nominal-wage adjustment by choosing an average rate of price (and wage) ination
well above unity.
This paper denes the measure of grease ination as the dierence between the two gures
reported above. Subtracting optimal gross ination under the asymmetric-cost model from
its corresponding value under the symmetric-cost model delivers an estimate of optimal
grease ination for the U.S. economy at approximately 0.012, that is, 1.2 percent per year.
Since the condence interval of the symmetric-cost model is very narrow and near unity, a
95 percent condence interval for the optimal grease ination would range roughly from 0.2
to 1.6 percent.
13The lower and upper bounds of this interval are computed as follows. First, we draw 120 independent
realizations of  from the empirical joint density function of the SMM estimates. Then, for each realization
of , we compute the expected ination rate. Finally, the bounds of the condence interval are the 2:5th
and 97:5th quantiles of the simulated expected ination rates.
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4.2 Impulse Responses
This section examines how the economy responds to shocks. Starting at the stochastic
steady state, the economy is subjected to an unexpected temporary shock, and the responses
of consumption, hours worked, price ination, wage ination, the real wage, and the interest
rate are then plotted as a function of time. In linear models, the responses to a shock of
size  are one-half those to a shock size 2 and the mirror image of those to a shock of size
 . Thus, any convenient normalization (e.g.,  = 1) summarizes all relevant information
about dynamics. However, in nonlinear models like ours, responses will typically depend
on both the sign and the size of the shock.14 Thus, we plot responses to innovations of size
+1; +2,  1, and  2 standard deviations. Responses to productivity shocks when  = 0
and 901:4 are reported in Figures 2 and 3, respectively. The vertical axis is the percentage
deviation from the deterministic steady state and the at line is the level of the stochastic
steady state. The distance between this line and zero represents the eect of uncertainty
on the unconditional rst-moments of the variables and, thus, the model's departure from
certainty equivalence.
First, consider the responses in Figure 2, where  = 0: Following a negative shock,
consumption, hours, wage ination, and the real wage decrease, while price ination and the
nominal interest rate increase. The converse happens following a positive shock. There is
very little asymmetry between positive and negative, and between small and large shocks.
Now, consider the responses in Figure 3, where  = 901:4. A negative productivity
shock decreases the marginal productivity of labor and consequently the real wage must fall.
This is an example of the type of shock that Tobin had in mind in his presidential address
to the American Economic Association. From Figures 2 and 3, it is apparent that the real
wage does indeed fall as required but that the optimal adjustment depends on the size of
the asymmetry parameter  :
When  = 0, the nominal wage decreases and price level increases (Figure 2). When
 > 0, the Ramsey policy involves positive average rates of price and wage ination. Hence,
in Figure 3, the nominal wage still increases or decreases by very little. Wage ination is
initially larger than its steady state when the shock is large and most of the reduction in the
real wage is achieved by an increase in the price level. Thus, the response of price ination
is larger when  > 0 than when  = 0 and more than proportional when the shock is large.
Hours and consumption decrease following a negative shock, and their response to a large
shock of  2 is more than twice of that to a smaller shock of  :
14See Gallant, Rossi and Tauchen (1993), and Koop, Pesaran, and Potter (1996) for more complete treat-
ments of impulse-response analysis in nonlinear systems.
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Consider also the eect of a positive productivity shock. In this case, the real wage
increases but again the adjustment depends on the value of  : In general, the adjustment
takes place with a decrease of the price level and an increase in the nominal wage. However,
the decrease of the price level is smaller and the increase in the nominal wage is larger than
in the case where  = 0. This eect increases when the productivity shock is larger. The
increase of hour and consumption and the decrease in the nominal rate is much smaller when
 > 0 and the response to large and small shocks are quantitatively similar.
4.3 Higher-Order Moments
This section derives and evaluates the model predictions for higher-order moments of the
variables. This exercise is important for three reasons. First, in contrast to linear DSGE
models that inherit their higher-order properties directly from the shock innovations, the
nonlinear propagation mechanism in our model means that economic variables may be non-
Gaussian, even if the productivity innovations are Gaussian. Second, this observation means
that up to the extent that actual data has non-Gaussian features, comparing the higher-
order moments predicted by the model with those of the data may be a useful tool in model
evaluation. Finally, since previous literature on downward wage rigidity documents the
positive skewness of individual nominal wage changes, it is interesting to examine whether
the same is true for the representative household in our model.
The skewness and kurtosis predicted by the models with asymmetric and quadratic wage
adjustment costs are computed on the basis of 10000 simulated observations and reported
in Table 2, along with their respective counterparts computed using U.S. data. In the U.S.
data, the nominal interest rate and the rates of price and wage ination are positively skewed
and leptokurtic, consumption is negatively skewed and leptokurtic, and hours worked and the
real wage are mildly skewed but platykurtic. (Leptokurtic distributions are characterized
by a sharp peak at the mode and fat tails, while platykurtic distributions are characterized
by atter peaks around the mode and thin tails.)
The model with quadratic wage adjustment costs generally predicts distributions with
little or no skewness and kurtosis similar to that of the Normal distribution. In contrast,
the model with asymmetric costs predicts positively skewed and leptokurtic rates of nominal
interest, price ination and wage ination. The prediction of leptokurtic wage ination is in
agreement with microeconomic studies based on individual wage changes (see, among others,
Akerlof, Dickens and Perry, 1996). Predictions regarding consumption are relatively more
accurate than those of the quadratic model in that consumption is leptokurtic is negatively
skewed, though in the latter case not as much as in the data. On the other hand, both
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models deliver rather imperfect predictions regarding hours worked and the real wage. In
particular, the asymmetric cost model predicts negatively skewed hours and thick-tailed
distributions for hours and real wage than in the data. These results are summarized in
Figure 4 that plots the histograms for price and wage ination in the data and for both
models.
4.4 Comparison with Strict Ination Targeting
In order to better understand the degree of optimal grease ination under the Ramsey policy,
this section computes the ination rate that delivers the highest (unconditional) welfare when
the monetary authority follows a simple rule that strictly hits the ination target. Figure
5 plots unconditional welfare for dierent values of the ination target and indicates that,
given the estimated parameters, the optimal ination target would be around 3 percent per
year. This value is more than twice as large as that of the Ramsey policy. The reason
is that positive ination in a model with downward wage rigidity is driven by prudence.
With limited knowledge and less exibility with respect to shocks, the ination targeting
government needs a larger buer above zero ination to eschew paying the costs associated
with nominal wage cuts.
5 Conclusion
This paper investigates Tobin's proposition that ination greases the wheels of the labor
market in the context of a simple but fully-specied dynamic general equilibrium model.
Previous research based on linearized DSGE models did not examine this issue because, by
construction, linearization eliminates the asymmetries of the underlying model. Although
microeconomic research documents asymmetries in the raw wage data, the micro data itself
contains elements of both economic structure and individual behavior and cannot fully reveal
the mechanism through which downward wage rigidity may generate aggregate implications.
Furthermore, the question is important because of the current discrepancy between theory|
that prescribes zero-to-negative ination rates|and actual practice|where central banks
target low, but positive, ination rates.
SMM estimates based on the second order approximation of model indicate that U.S.
nominal wages are downwardly rigid, that optimal grease ination is approximately 1.2 per-
cent per year, and that downward wage rigidity has nontrivial implications for the dynamics
of aggregate variables. Needless to say, the estimate of optimal grease ination may depend
on the model specication. For example, in a model with ex-post heterogeneity, optimal
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grease ination may be larger because productivity growth (and hence real wages) would
vary across agents. In contrast, in a model with technological growth, optimal grease ina-
tion may be smaller because a positive trend growth in real wages would decrease the need
for nominal wage cuts. In ongoing and future work, we study these questions in the context
of a fully-edged monetary economy, examine the role of asymmetric shocks, and derive the
business cycle implications of asymmetric nominal rigidities.
[16]
Table 1. SMM Estimates
Wage Adjustment Costs
Parameter Description Asymmetric Quadratic
(1) (2)
 Discount rate 0:998 0:998
(0:166) (0:402)
 Consumption curvature 1:093 0:874
(0:108) (0:222)
 Leisure curvature 3:6 10 6 1:2 10 6
(0:418) (1:095)
 Wage adjustment cost 33:72y 71:98
(25:08) (136:4)
 Price adjustment cost 35:23 7:687
(20:08) (7:215)
 Wage asymmetry 901:40 0
(426:2)  
 Autoregressive coecient 0:927 0:922
(0:018) (0:027)
 Standard deviation 0:012 0:012
(0:002) (0:002)
Notes: The gures in parenthesis are standard errors. The superscripts  and y denote the
rejection of the hypothesis that the true parameter value is zero at the 5 and 10 percent
signicance level, respectively.
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Table 2. Higher-Order Moments
Wage Adjustment Costs
Variable U.S. Data Asymmetric Quadratic
(1) (2) (3)
A. Skewness
Consumption  1:049  0:101 0:016
Hours 0:215  1:027  0:073
Price Ination 1:115 0:992 0:028
Wage Ination 0:821 1:655  0:083
Real Wage 0:233 0:081 0:039
Nominal Interest 1:030 0:576 0:155
B. Kurtosis
Consumption 4:030 3:023 2:965
Hours 2:152 4:776 3:078
Price Ination 4:872 4:640 3:119
Wage Ination 4:515 7:826 3:153
Real Wage 1:820 2:916 2:937
Nominal Interest 4:333 3:679 3:153
Notes: The skewness and kurtosis predicted by the asymmetric and quadratic cost models
were computed using 10000 simulated observations. The skewness and kurtosis of the
Normal distribution are 0 and 3, respectively.
[18]
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